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I know that I shall never become a professor. The UK higher education system sets a range of tests for that title, and I do not meet several of them. That is quite all right.
I have deep respect for those who do earn it. Most professors are bright, committed people who have spent years teaching, researching, publishing and helping students to grasp their field. A small number are privileged, vain and almost heroic in their capacity for self-regard. Even they, though, have usually made some real contribution to knowledge.
The title therefore means something. It is not a decorative word to bolt onto a business name because “Mister Windows” lacked the required academic weight.
I accept that fitting double glazing may demand skill, care and sound judgement. I remain less certain that it marks the holder as a senior scholar of fenestration.
Still, perhaps Professor Windows has an extensive publication record. I look forward to his inaugural lecture: Towards a Unified Theory of the Casement.
The redevelopment of Whitehill & Bordon and RAF Upper Heyford provides a useful comparison because both involve large former Ministry of Defence sites acquired by the Dorchester Group. Despite this shared ownership, the planning approaches adopted at each site differ in important respects. Whitehill & Bordon demonstrates a planning strategy in which contamination was treated as a fundamental issue to resolve BEFORE redevelopment, whereas debate surrounding RAF Upper Heyford has increasingly focused on whether environmental investigation has kept pace with the scale of construction.
At Whitehill & Bordon, the possibility of contamination was recognised from the outset. East Hampshire District Council, the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA), the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO), the Environment Agency and the developer worked together within a long-term regeneration framework. Planning documents accepted that a century of military activity would have left areas of contamination requiring investigation and, where necessary, remediation before housing could be occupied. Planning permissions therefore required phased site investigations, contamination risk assessments, remediation strategies and independent verification reports to demonstrate that land had been made suitable for residential use. This approach reflected national planning policy, which requires land to be suitable for its intended use before development proceeds.
RAF Upper Heyford has followed a different path. Since the site’s acquisition in 2009, planning has focused on delivering a major new settlement. Conditions relating to contaminated land did form part of planning permissions, but they sat alongside a much broader programme of phased development.
With the recent identification of PFAS in the water course nearby, almost certainly linked to historic firefighting foams, many people have asked whether the extent of contamination should have been established before substantial residential development took place.
At the same time, the planning authority appears to be relying on planning conditions requiring further investigation and remediation where contamination is encountered, but do not appear to have taken any concrete action on this basis.
The contrast between the two developments therefore lies less in whether contamination was recognised, than in how prominently it featured within the planning process.
At Whitehill & Bordon, contamination appears to have provided the framework within which redevelopment proceeded. Environmental investigation and remediation formed central elements of the regeneration strategy from an early stage.
At RAF Upper Heyford, looking with the most generous of minds, environmental investigation has continued alongside development through successive planning phases.
The fact that both sites came under the ownership of the Dorchester Group is notable but should not be overstated. While Dorchester Group’s experience may have been valuable learning, there is no published evidence that the company’s involvement at Whitehill & Bordon influenced decisions relating to RAF Upper Heyford. This sharpens our attention to the wider role of planning authorities, statutory regulators and the policy context within which decisions were made.
Comparing the planning conditions, environmental reports and regulatory responses across the two sites may therefore help to identify why two former military developments, managed by the same developer, appear to have followed different trajectories in their treatment of environmental risk.