Critical Research Journal | Graham Wilson – Page 4 – Academically Oriented Photographer

As professionals get older, they often seem to encounter younger individuals who come across something for the first time and assume that it is either new or that they have invented something that nobody has heard of before. In effect, those younger people are simply ignorant of the history of their subject and naïve to think that nobody would have thought of it before them. They have an inflated sense of their own capability. There is a body of academic research about this…

Scholars frame this phenomenon in terms of expertise, metacognition, and learning stages, rather than age per se. Research across social and cognitive psychology shows that people new to a field often mistake first exposure for innovation, and early insight for mastery. This pattern reflects predictable limits in self-assessment rather than a flaw of character.

The most influential account comes from work by David Dunning and Justin Kruger. Their research on what became known as the Dunning–Kruger effect showed that individuals with low skill in a domain tend to overrate both their competence and the quality of their ideas (Dunning & Kruger, 1999). The key claim does not rest on arrogance. Instead, it rests on metacognitive limits. The skills needed to judge quality overlap with the skills needed to produce it. When people lack those skills, they cannot see the gaps in their own knowledge. As a result, they believe their ideas show originality when they simply repeat earlier work.

Later studies refined this claim. Kruger and Dunning argued that as expertise grows, confidence often falls before it stabilises (Kruger & Dunning, 2009). Increased knowledge exposes prior debates, failed approaches, and unresolved tensions. This process weakens inflated claims of novelty. It also explains why experienced professionals tend to greet bold claims from newcomers with scepticism rather than excitement. They recognise the idea, even when the speaker does not.

A second strand of research concerns illusory superiority, sometimes called the better-than-average effect. Studies show that people routinely rate their abilities, insight, and originality above those of peers, especially where standards remain vague or feedback remains slow (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). Intellectual and creative work offers fertile ground for this bias. Claims of originality resist easy testing, and many fields reward confidence in speech more than accuracy in history. Under these conditions, novice thinkers may assume their perspective stands apart when it merely stands early.

Educational psychology adds further depth. Research on learning curves shows that beginners often pass through a phase of high confidence soon after first contact with a topic. Bjork, Dunlosky, and Kornell describe this as an illusion of understanding, where surface fluency masks shallow grasp (Bjork et al., 2013). Early models feel clear because they remain simple. Learners have not yet met contradiction, context, or edge cases. This stage invites premature claims of insight and invention.

Work on expertise development supports this view. Studies of expert performance show that mastery involves long exposure to prior work, criticism, and failure. Experts learn to locate their ideas within a lineage rather than outside it (Ericsson et al., 2006). Novices lack that map. Without it, they mistake personal discovery for historical novelty. The claim “no one has thought of this before” often translates to “I have not yet read enough”.

Importantly, the literature avoids moral judgement. These effects do not imply that younger or less experienced people lack intelligence or creativity. They reflect normal cognitive limits during learning. Many researchers note that early confidence can serve a motivational role. It sustains engagement long enough for deeper learning to begin. The problem arises when institutions reward confidence without insisting on historical grounding.

From a professional standpoint, the tension reflects a clash between short memory and long memory. Early learners work from immediate insight. Experienced practitioners work from accumulated context. Each position carries value, but confusion arises when novelty becomes a social claim rather than an empirical one. Academic research strongly supports your observation. It also explains why time in a field tends to foster restraint, citation, and humility rather than louder claims of invention.

My first real exposure to this came when I was trying to help managers in a chemical plant implement problem-solving groups. The managers had a fraction of the experience of the employees who were operating the plant. The operators, on the other hand, didn’t have access to the experimental design skills that [a handful of] the managers had. Once they were helped to run their own trials, the operators soon demonstrated their superior ability to optimise the plant, and the managers learnt to eat humble pie.

References

Alicke, M. D., & Govorun, O. (2005). The better-than-average effect. In M. D. Alicke, D. A. Dunning, & J. I. Krueger (Eds.), The self in social judgment (pp. 85–106). Psychology Press.

Bjork, R. A., Dunlosky, J., & Kornell, N. (2013). Self-regulated learning: Beliefs, techniques, and illusions. Annual Review of Psychology, 64, 417–444. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143823

Dunning, D., & Kruger, J. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognising one’s own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6), 1121–1134. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121

Ericsson, K. A., Charness, N., Feltovich, P. J., & Hoffman, R. R. (2006). The Cambridge handbook of expertise and expert performance. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511816796

Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (2009). Unskilled and unaware of it: How people fail to recognise their own incompetence. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4(1), 30–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01130.x

People often describe a moment when their parents begin to feel like children. The phrase captures something real, yet it also misleads. What changes is not a return to childhood, but a shift in responsibility, power, and care. This shift unfolds through health, loss, and social context rather than age alone. Understanding this distinction matters because it shapes how adult children respond, and how older parents retain their dignity and sense of self.

The first signs tend to appear in midlife. An adult child notices small lapses in memory, growing trouble with forms, or unease with new systems. These moments mark the start of a role change. The parent no longer acts only as guide or protector. They begin to need support. Blenkner (1965) described this process as “filial maturity”, where the adult child learns to see the parent as a vulnerable other rather than as an authority figure. This change does not depend on the number of years lived; it depends on a new balance of risk and care.

As health declines, so the shift deepens. Illness, frailty, or bereavement can erode habits that once happened without any thought. The adult child now steps in to manage appointments, finances, or safety. Many people describe this as becoming “the parent”, but what they often mean is that they now hold foresight and responsibility. Zarit et al. (1980) showed that this change in role places a heavy emotional load on adult children, not because care itself feels wrong, but because it alters their own identity and expectations. The past relationship does not vanish, it rubs alongside the present one.

It is tempting to read this change as regression. Yet psychological theory argues against this view. In Erikson’s (1982) account of the life course, later life centres on meaning, loss, and review, not a return to earlier stages of dependence. Older adults may seek routine, resist change, or rely on others, but these acts arise from adaptation to loss rather than from childlike development. Baltes and Smith (2003) frame ageing as a mix of gains and losses, managed through selective dependence and compensation. Dependence here reflects skill and judgement, not failure.

Calling older parents “like children” also risks infantilisation. Children grow towards autonomy and power. Older adults often move away from them. On the surface these may look alike; both may need help with dressing, transport, or planning, for example. However, the meaning differs, as the older person carries a lifetime of identity, values, and memory. Treating dependence as a return to childhood erases this history and can strip dignity. Steinman (1979) warned that role reversal should never imply a loss of personhood, since the parent remains a full moral agent even when dependent.

The emotional strain of this shift often links to unfinished business. Brody (1985) showed that distress in caregiving stems less from the tasks themselves and more from earlier conflict, guilt, or unmet needs within the relationship. When adult children hold power over parents who once shaped their lives, old wounds can surface. Care then becomes a site of moral testing. Can one offer help without revenge? Can one guide without control?

Culture and social structure shape when and how this shift occurs. In families with shared homes or strong kin networks, responsibility may spread across many hands. The change then feels slower and less stark. Conversely, in societies where work and housing pull families apart, crisis often triggers a sudden role reversal. Finch and Mason (1993) showed that class, gender, and cultural norms all govern who provides care and how it feels. Policy also matters as strong health and social care systems can delay dependence and reduce strain on individuals and families. Weak systems, though, push families into roles they may feel unready to hold.

It helps to replace the idea of parents becoming children with a more nuanced perspective. What unfolds is a renegotiation of responsibility across time; authority softens, care flows back. The parent does not shrink into childhood, but enters a phase marked by loss, need, and reflection. The adult child enters a phase marked by duty, grief, and moral labour. Each must adapt.

This distinction matters. It protects older adults from being spoken to as if they lacked sense or worth. It also frees adult children from the false belief that care means dominance. Good care recognises dependence while honouring history. It supports without erasure. The task is hard, because it asks people to hold two truths at once. The parent needs help. The parent remains themselves. Age sets the stage, but life writes the script.

References

Baltes, P. B., & Smith, J. (2003). New frontiers in the future of aging: From successful aging of the young old to the dilemmas of the fourth age. Gerontology, 49(2), 123–135.

Blenkner, M. (1965). Social work and family relationships in later life. Social Service Review, 39, 318–329.

Brody, E. M. (1985). Parent care as a normative family stress. The Gerontologist, 25(1), 19–29.

Erikson, E. H. (1982). The life cycle completed. New York: Norton.

Finch, J., & Mason, J. (1993). Negotiating family responsibilities. London: Routledge.

Steinman, S. (1979). The older parent–adult child relationship. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 41(2), 275–287.

Zarit, S. H., Reever, K. E., & Bach-Peterson, J. (1980). Relatives of the impaired elderly: Correlates of feelings of burden. The Gerontologist, 20(6), 649–655.